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COMMENT AND INFERENCE UNDER THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
In the United States when the prosecution says, "The state
rests," the accused has an option to testify in his own defense or to
exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. In several of the
states when the accused adopts the latter alternative, comment on
his silence by the court or prosecutor or both and an inference of
guilt are permitted. The subject of this comment is the constitu-
tionality and desirability of comment or of inference.
The question of the constitutionality of comment or inference
arises under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fifth amend-
ment issue is whether the exertion of pressure to testify by the
use of comment or inference violates the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. The fourteenth amendment issue is whether an
inference of guilt which is used as evidence for the prosecution
violates the accused's right to due process.
Inference and comment do not violate the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination if they are compatible with the purposes
of the privilege. After culling, two significant purposes of the privi-
lege remain. They are the protection of the accused from the
probing of an over-zealous questioner and the promotion of a fair
state-individual balance. A prohibition against comment and infer-
ence is unnecessary to maintain either purpose. First, probing by
the prosecutor easily can be controlled by the court. Second, the
multiple safeguards now accorded the accused at the trial stage
in a criminal proceeding make it both unnecessary and undesirable
to tip the scales further in favor of an accused and hold comment
or inference impermissible.
Inference violates the accused's right to due process if it results
in shifting the burden of proof. This is not the case. Permitting the
prosecution to use the accused's silence as an item of evidence con-
noting guilt does not enable the prosecution to secure a conviction
without showing the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It merely secures to the prosecution a piece of evidence with which
to prove its case-a piece of evidence which is not destructive of a
fair state-individual balance.
Although comment or inference should not be prohibited on
constitutional grounds, it should be discarded if it lessens the
accuracy of the guilt determining process. As comment or inference
now exist, there is no guarantee that the accused's silence is relevant
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to the probability of his guilt. For example, a record of prior con-
viction or a poor demeanor may account for the silence of the
accused. Thus comment or inference should be banned until the
formulation of some test which prevents comment or inference from
benefiting the prosecution when the accused's silence is explicable
by something other than guilt. A test for so circumscribing com-
ment or inference is suggested in this article.
COMMENT OR INFERENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT
In Twining v. New Jersey 1 the jury was instructed that it
might draw an unfavorable inference from the failure of the accused
to testify in denial of evidence which tended to incriminate him.
The law of New Jersey permitted such an inference to be drawn.
In upholding the constitutionality of the instruction the United
States Supreme Court found that the privilege against self-
incrimination as guaranteed by the fifth amendment did not apply
to the states. A headnote states, "Exemption from compulsory self-
incrimination did not form part of the law of the land prior to the
separation of the colonies from the mother-country, nor is it one
of the fundamental rights, immunities and privileges of citizens of
the United States, or an element of due process of law, within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment
thereto." 2 Therefore the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether or not the drawing of an unfavorable inference from the
silence of an accused violated the fifth amendment.3
Thirty-nine years later, in Adamson v. California,4 the Supreme
Court reiterated its decision in Twining. In Adamson the prosecu-
tion acting under the authority of California Constitution, article
I, section 13 and California Penal Code Section 1323 commented on
the accused's failure to take the stand. The defendant contended 1)
that the fifth amendment was applicable to the states and 2) that
comment as permitted by the California Constitution violated the
privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court assumed
without deciding that permission extended to the court, counsel and
jury to comment on and consider the accused's failure by his tes-
timony to deny or explain facts in the case against him would
violate the accused's privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment. However, the Court held that because the fifth
amendment was not made effective in the states by the fourteenth
1 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
2 Id. at 78-79.
3 Id. at 79.
4 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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amendment, the defendant's rights were not violated.5 Justice
Frankfurter, who agreed with the majority that the fifth amend-
ment was not applicable to the states, wrote a concurring opinion
in which he specifically addressed himself to the question of com-
ment. He stated, "For historical reasons a limited immunity from
the common duty to testify was written into the Federal Bill of
Rights, and I am prepared to agree that, as part of that immunity,
comment on the failure of an accused to take the witness stand
is forbidden in federal prosecutions." 6 Justice Black, in a dissenting
opinion, concluded that the majority of the Court did not consider
comment violative of the privilege: "the Court's opinion, as I
read it, strongly implies that the Fifth Amendment does not, of
itself, bar comment upon failure to testify in federal courts ... 
Thus, although the question of whether the drawing of an inference
from the accused's failure to take the stand violates the privilege
is discussed in Adamson, taken as a whole, the opinion of the Court
is no more enlightening than the opinion of the Court in Twining.
On June 1, 1964, the Supreme Court overruled Twining and
Adamson and held that the privilege against self-incrimination as
guaranteed by the fifth amendment applied to the states. The issue
was presented to the Court in Malloy v. Hogan.' Malloy had been
arrested in a gambling raid in 1959 in Hartford, Connecticut. He
pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of poolselling and was sentenced
to a year in jail and a $500 fine. After serving ninety days, he was
released on probation for two years. Sixteen months after his
guilty plea, Malloy was ordered to testify before a referee appointed
by the Superior Court of Hartford County to investigate gambling
and other criminal activities in the county. When asked a series of
questions 9 concerning his 1959 arrest and conviction, he refused
to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination.
The Superior Court found him in contempt and ordered him
incarcerated until he answered the questions. Malloy applied to
the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus. It denied the writ
and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld the denial.'0
6 Id. at 50-54.
6 Id. at 61 (concurring opinion).
7 Id. at 69 (dissenting opinion).
8 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9 The questions asked Malloy were:
(1) for whom did he work on September 11, 1959; (2) who selected and
paid his counsel in connection with his arrest on that date and subsequent
conviction; (3) who selected and paid his bondsman; (4) who paid his fine;
(5) what was the name of the tenant in the apartment in which he was
arrested; (6) did he know John Bergoti. Id. at 12.
10 Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A2d 744 (1963).
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In so doing it found that the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination did not apply to the states, that the fourteenth
amendment granted Malloy no privilege, and that he had not cor-
rectly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination available
under the Connecticut Constitution. Having granted certiorari the
Supreme Court found 1) the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was applicable to the states, 2) it applied with
full federal constitutional content, and 3) Malloy's privilege had
been violated." However, the Supreme Court's reversal of the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors did not resolve the question
of the constitutionality of comment or an inference under the
federal constitution because the factual pattern in Malloy did not
include comment or an inference. The question is important be-
cause at present six states-Iowa, New Jersey, Connecticut, New
Mexico, California and Ohio-permit comment or an inference
or both.
COMMENT OR INFERENCE IN THE STATES WHICH PERMIT THEM
While the six enumerated states all permit recognition of the
accused's silence, the significance accorded to such silence varies.
A discussion of the weight attached to the accused's silence in the
various states is pertinent because it is arguable that the Supreme
Court should reject en bloc immunity to the accused, and hold
comment or inference impermissible only when it is likely to result
in undue prejudice.'" The scope of comment or inference as it
developed in Iowa, New Jersey, Connecticut, New Mexico, Cali-
fornia and Ohio follows.
The Iowa Supreme Court held in State v. Ferguson ' 3 that
comment by the prosecutor did not violate "due process of law"
as secured by the Iowa Constitution, 4 or the Iowa competency
statute." In reaching the conclusion that comment did not violate
due process under the state constitution, the court relied on the
rejection by the Supreme Court of the United States of the due
process argument made in Twining. However, in Twining due proc-
ess was argued as a ground for carrying through the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination to the states, while in
11 Supra note 8, at 14 (dissenting opinion).
12 See section entitled Test for Determining Violation of the Privilege infra at
588, for a suggested test for ascertaining when the accused is unduly prejudiced.
'3 226 Iowa 361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939).
'4 Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.
'. Iowa Code § 781.12 (1946):
Defendants in all criminal proceedings shall be competent witnesses in their
own behalf, but cannot be called as witnesses by the state.
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Ferguson it was argued as a basis for finding that in a state which
recognized a privilege against self-incrimination due process would
prevent comment. 16 While the Iowa Constitution did not guarantee
a privilege against self-incrimination, the court in interpreting the
due process clause of the Iowa Constitution found that it encom-
passed the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus the court did
not really answer the accused's challenge that comment violated
due process as guaranteed by the Iowa Constitution. The probable
explanation for the court's willingness to permit comment is that
the Iowa legislature had indicated its approval of comment by
repealing a statute which disallowed comment.17 The court said:
Were we to sustain appellant's contention herein, the result would
be that, under the guise of construing the due process clause, we
would, in effect, re-enact Section 13891 of the Code of 1927,
which the 43rd Gen. Assem.... chose to repeal.' 8
New Jersey, like Iowa, has no specific constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. However, the New Jersey courts recog-
nize the common law privilege against self-incrimination as being
in full force in the state.19 Notwithstanding this the New Jersey
courts have permitted comment by the court 20 and by the prose-
cuting attorney,21 and have permitted the drawing of an adverse
inference by the jury.22
Connecticut recognizes the privilege against self-incrimination
in its constitution.28 However, the Connecticut courts have held
16 Supra note 13.
'7 Section 13891 Codes of 1924 and 1927, formerly § 5484 Code of 1897, repealed
by Chapter 269 of the Acts of the Forty-third General Assembly in 1929, said in effect
that should a defendant not elect to become a witness, that fact should create no
weight against him, nor should it be the subject of comment by the prosecutor.
38 State v. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 373, 283 N.W. at 923; see also State v.
Stennett, 220 Iowa 388, 260 N.W. 732 (1935), in which repeal of Iowa Code § 13891
(1927), was the basis of a decision that prosecutorial comment on the accused's failure
to testify was permissible.
19 Zdanowicz v. State, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
20 Parker v. State, 61 N.J.L. 308, 39 At. 651 (Sup. Ct. 1898), aff'd per curiam,
62 N.J.L. 801, 45 Atl. 1092 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899), held that the Act of 1871, § 8 of
the Evidence Act, (Rev. 1877, at 379), repealed, [now N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 81-8
(1951)], which permitted an accused to become a witness in his own behalf, did not
prohibit comment or the drawing of an inference; and that when facts which were
introduced by the prosecution might be disproved by the accused if they were not true,
the accused's failure to take the stand might be considered.
21 State v. Lisena, 129 N.J.L. 569, 30 A2d 593 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 131
N.J.L. 39, 34 A.2d 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
22 State v. Bright, 123 N.J.L. 435, 8 A2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd per curiam,
124 N.J.L. 451, 12 A._d 677 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
23 Conn. Const. art. I, § 9 provides:
He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, but by due course of law.
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that the fact that the accused did not take the stand may be con-
sidered by the jury and an adverse inference drawn therefrom.
This is apparently limited to those instances in which the state has
made a prima facie case,28 but the evidence of the state which
establishes the prima facie case may be circumstantial. 26 Comment
upon the accused's failure to take the stand is permitted only to
the court; 7 comment by the prosecutor is prohibited by statute.28
New Mexico's constitution provides that "no person shall be
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding." 29
However, when faced with a statute 30 which permitted comment
but no inference, the court upheld the statute's constitutionality,
saying that the statute was a procedural rule promulgated by the
court and did not affect the substantive rights of the accused.3 1
In 1934, California amended its constitution to permit com-
ment by court and counsel and consideration by the court or jury
when the defendant fails to explain or deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the case against him.32 The comment and con-
sideration which are now allowed pertain not to the accused's
failure to take the stand, but to his failure to explain away in-
criminating evidence.33 His refusal to testify does not supply any
missing element of proof for the prosecution. 34 And it is proper for
the trial judge to instruct the jury that no inference is to be drawn
from the accused's refusal to testify.38
24 State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 Atl. 828 (1929).
25 State v. DelVecchio, 145 Conn. 549, 145 A2d 199 (1958) ; State v. Nelson, 139
Conn. 124, 90 A.2d 157 (1952).
26 State v. Grosso, 139 Conn. 229, 93 A2d 146 (1952).
27 State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 Atl. 181 (1934).
28 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-84 (1960) provides:
Any person on trial for crime shall be a competent witness, and at his or her
option may testify or refuse to testify upon such trial. . . . The neglect or
refusal of an accused party to testify shall not be commented upon to the court
or jury.
As interpreted in State v. Heno, supra note 27, only comment by the prosecutor is
prohibited.
29 N.M. Const. art II, § 15.
30 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-12-19 (1964), formerly, N.M. Trial Ct. Rules 45-504,
provides:
His failure to testify shall create no presumption against him, but may be the
subject of comment or argument. In trials in the district court such comment
or argument shall be within the discretionary control of the court, and shall
entitle the accused to an instruction that the jury shall indulge no presumption
against the accused because of his failure to testify.
31 State v. Sandoval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P2d 850 (1955).
32 Calif. Const. art. I, § 13.
33 People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P2d 3 (1946) ; see also Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917).
34 People v. Casillas, 60 Cal. App. 2d 785, 141 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1943).
35 People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940).
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The Ohio Constitution as amended in 1912 provides that no
person in any criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself, but his failure to testify may be considered by the
court and jury and may be made the subject of comment by coun-
sel. 6 As originally enacted the constitution made no reference to
what was permissible when the accused failed to take the stand.87
This is understandable since the accused was not a competent
witness in Ohio until 1867.
The statute which granted competency as a witness to the
accused further provided: "nor shall the neglect or refusal to
testify create any presumption against him nor shall any reference
be made to, nor any comment upon, such neglect or refusal." 3 8
Instead of repealing the statute, Ohio amended its constitution
when it desired to permit notice to be taken of the defendant's
refusal to testify. Subsequent to the amendment of the constitution,
the legislature amended the competency statute to accord with the
constitution. 39 Thus, in Ohio, comment by counsel 40 and considera-
tion by court and jury is specifically permitted both by the con-
stitution and by statute. It has been held that court and jury may
consider the defendant's refusal to testify: 1) when the evidence
offered against the defendant calls for an explanation,41 2) as an
inference 42 though not a presumption 43 of guilt, 3) as a makeweight
in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when the state has made
out a prima facie case and no evidence has been offered by the
defendant, 44 4) as a makeweight in finding guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt though the state's case is based solely on circumstantial
evidence,4 and 5) as substantial evidence of his guilt.46
36 Ohio Const. art. I, § 10.
37 Ohio Const. art. I, § 10 (1803).
38 64 Laws of Ohio 260 (1867), codified, 66 Laws of Ohio 287, § 140 (1869).
See Ohio Gen. Code § 13661 (1910).
39 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.43 (Page 1953) provides:
On the trial of a criminal cause, a person charged with an offense may, at
his own request, be a witness, but not otherwise. The failure of such person
to testify may be considered by the court and jury and may be made the
subject of comment by counsel.
40 Vecchio v. State, 32 Ohio L. Rep. 553 (Ct. App. 1930).
41 Halsey v. State, 42 Ohio App. 291, 182 N.E. 127 (1932).
42 Long v. State, 109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923) ; Leonard v. State, 100
Ohio St. 456, 127 N.E. 464 (1919) ; City of Cincinnati v. Hawkins, 48 Ohio L. Abs.
604, 75 N.E. 2d 218 (Ct. App. 1947); City of Cincinnati v. Hyams, 77 Ohio App.
403, 67 N.E. 2d 39 (1945).
43 Hinz v. State, 15 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 88 (Ct. App. 1911), aff'd, 86 Ohio St.
348, 99 N.E. 1127 (1912).
44 City of Cleveland v. McNea, 158 Ohio St. 138, 107 N.E.2d 201 (1952).
5 State v. Butler, 43 Ohio Op. 321, 94 N.E.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1949) ; Leslie v.
State, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 299 (Ct. App. 1929).
46 Bair v. Cleveland, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 618 (Ct. App. 1931).
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In summary, the present forms of comment or inference may
be assigned to four broad categories. The first category represents
the situation as it exists in New Mexico. There the defendant's
failure to testify is accorded the least significance, because the jury
is not permitted to draw an adverse inference from the failure
even though it may be pointed out to them by the prosecutor.47
This obviates consideration of a fourteenth amendment due process
argument based on a shifting of the burden of proof by using the
silence of the accused as evidence. However, the New Mexico statute
is not immune from attack as violative of the privilege. An accused
must feel more compulsion to testify when he is aware that his
silence will be commented upon than when he knows it will pass
unremarked by the prosecution. Lack of knowledge of the events
which occur in the jury room makes it difficult to postulate
the effect which comment has upon a jury. However, it is more
probable than not that the subtle adverse influence which the
silence of an accused produces is augmented when it is specifically
pointed out to a jury by an authoritative figure.48
The second category includes comment and inference as they
exist in California. Both fourteenth and fifth amendment issues are
instant. The fourteenth amendment due process argument is appli-
cable because an inference of the truth of the prosecution's case
based on the accused's silence concerning a matter about which
he reasonably could be expected to have knowledge is allowed.
Hypothetical number one is illustrative of this situation.49
XYZ constitutes the quantum of evidence which must be
proved to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
XYZ could be found proved by the jury. The defendant does
not take the stand. X is something about which the defendant
could reasonably be expected to have knowledge. The fact
that the defendant does not take the stand may be used to find
the truth of X by a jury which does not believe X proved on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence alone.
Absent fifth amendment considerations such inference is ap-
parently permissible. The Supreme Court in Adamson held the
47 N. A. Stat. Ann. § 41-12-19 (1964).
48 For an analysis of the constitutionality of such pressure see section entitled
Purposes of the Privilege infra at 591.
49 People v. Adamson, supra note 33, at 490-91, 165 P. 2d at 10.
The jury ... should have been instructed that the defendant's failure to deny
or explain evidence presented against him does not create a presumption or
warrant an inference of guilt, but should be considered only in relation to
evidence that he fails to explain or deny ... the jury may consider his failure
to do so-as ... indicating that among the inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.
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above described use of the accused's silence constitutional because
1) California's constitution, which at that time provided the only
applicable privilege against self-incrimination, specifically permitted
it, and 2) the defendant's silence was not considered as evidence of
his guilt, but only as evidence of the strength of the prosecution's
case. 0 In reaching its decision the Court cited Caminetti v. United
States.r1 In that case the accused took the stand, but omitted to
explain or deny incriminating circumstances or events already in
evidence in which he participated and concerning which he was
fully informed.r2 The Court upheld the constitutionality of infer-
ence on the facts as presented.
While Caminetti and Adamson may be considered dispositive
of the fourteenth amendment argument concerning the permis-
sibility of the use of the silence of an accused as evidence, they
do not resolve the fifth amendment question. The pressure on an
accused to testify is substantially greater if he knows his silence
will be used to give credence to the prosecution's caseY3
The third category encompasses comment and inference as it
exists in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Iowa. There the weight to
be given to the accused's silence is left to the jurors who are in-
structed that they may draw reasonable inferences or may deter-
mine themselves what inferences should be drawn. As in California
both fourteenth and fifth amendment issues are involved. Hypo-
thetical number two exemplifies the advantage which results to the
prosecution in the aforementioned states. 4
XYZ is the quantum of evidence which must be proved to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. XYZ could
be considered proved by the jury. The defendant does not take
the stand. The fact that the defendant does not take the stand
may be used as a substitute for X, call it X1. Thus a jury which
disbelieves the truth of X can find the accused guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt by substituting X1 for X.
The result is that the jury may find the prosecution's case
proved by substituting the defendant's silence for a portion of the
prosecution's evidence which is both disbelieved and necessary to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is arguable that under
Caminetti this use of the accused's silence is permissible, because
50 Adamson v. California, supra note 4, at 55-56.
51 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
52 Id. at 495.
53 The constitutionality of such pressure is discussed in section entitled Purposes
of the Privilege infra at 591.
54 State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941) ; State v. Ferguson, supra
note 13; State v. Bright, supra note 22.
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there is no practical difference in using the defendant's silence to
prove the prosecution's case by showing the truth of what the
prosecution has presented and in using it to prove the prosecution's
case by supplying a substitutional item of evidence for the prosecu-
tion. This argument is not meritorious, however, because the infer-
ence permitted in California arises only when the accused reason-
ably could be expected to have knowledge about the particular
evidence to which it applies, while in Iowa, New Jersey, and
Connecticut there is no assurance of the relevancy of the accused's
silence to the particular evidence for which it is substituted. Thus
to uphold the constitutionality of the above described use of the
silence of an accused, the Court will have to go beyond Caminetti
and Adamson in which the inference was supported as an admission
of a particular fact. In substance, the Court will have to find that
the accused's silence is an admission of guilt and that the fourteenth
amendment permits the state to take advantage of the accused's
silence in proving its case against him. These prerequisites to find-
ing that the above described inference is permissible under the
fourteenth amendment and the fifth amendment and the constitu-
tionality of comment in this situation are both discussed later in
this article.
The fourth category comprises comment and inference in Ohio.
In this state the jury may be instructed that silence is substantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt. 5 Hypothetical number three de-
picts the probative force accorded to the accused's failure to testify
in Ohio. 6
XYZ is the quantum of evidence which must be proved to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. X could
55 Bair v. Cleveland, supra note 46.
56 It has been held that the jury can use the inference to supply the quantum of
evidence necessary to find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Cleve-
land v. McNea, supra note 44; State v. Butler, supra note 45. The decisions of the
above cited Ohio cases, do not permit the use of the silence of the defendant to supply
proof for any of the essential elements of the prosecution's case. This is harmonious
with the recommended instructions for Ohio juries, 3 Fess, Ohio Instructions To
Juries § 87.18:
The defendant did not see fit to take the witness stand in his own behalf.
There is no law whereby a defendant can be compelled to take the witness
stand or to testify in a case against him, but you are charged that you may
consider the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand in his own
behalf. This failure, however, cannot cure the failure upon the part of the
state, if any, to prove any of the essential elements required to convict; but,
otherwise you may consider the circumstances attending the failure of the
defendant to take the witness stand and attach thereto such significance and
weight, if any, as you believe to be justified.
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not be considered proved by the prosecution. The defendant
moves for a directed verdict. The judge overrules his motion.
The defendant does not take the stand. The jury finds against
the defendant. On appeal the court finds that the defendant's
failure to take the stand could have been used by the jury in find-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In effect the fact that the defendant does not take the stand
is the very piece of evidence which convicts him, for the probative
force of the defendant's non-appearance, an event which occurs
after the directed verdict motion, is weighed with the evidence
adduced before the directed verdict motion, giving the prosecution's
evidence a specious weight, i.e., a weight which it did not and could
not have had at the time of the motion. Thus in addition to the
aforementioned prerequisites to finding that the form of inference
sanctioned in Iowa, New Jersey, and Connecticut is permissible
under the fourteenth amendment-that silence of the accused is an
admission of guilt and that an inference which may replace an item
of the prosecution's case is tolerable-the Court will also have to
justify the use of the accused's silence to prove guilt in instances
where it cannot be considered proved otherwise, if inference in
Ohio is to be decreed constitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment.5 7
It is sufficient to say at this point that the argument for
holding inference or comment violative of the fifth amendment is
strongest in the context of the Ohio situation. The accused in fact
has no choice. The presumption which must be allowed is that if
he testifies he will incriminate himself. Otherwise the presumption
of guilt based on his silence is erroneous. If he does not testify, he
in fact incriminates himself, for his silence is of necessity used to
convict him.
A TEST FOR DETERMINING VIOLATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
The question becomes whether the Constitution as construed
in Malloy should be used to invalidate comment or inference as it
is used in the states or whether a judicially inhabitable half-way
house can be constructed in the form of a test which will rob com-
ment or inference of their prejudicial impact on the accused with-
out depriving the state of relevant evidence. The commentary of
history-particularly legislative intimations-indicates that com-
ment and inference have not been thought to violate the privilege.
Any test to determine whether comment or inference are violative
of the privilege may touch this history to draw support from it, but
must also go beyond history to the root purposes of the privilege.
57 See section entitled Fourteenth Amendment Constitutionality infra at 595.
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Comment or Inference in thre Legislatusres
In Malloy it was held that the fifth amendment applies to the
states with full federal constitutional content.58 Thus if it can be
found that the fifth amendment is a bar to comment or inference in
the federal courts, that finding is determinative of the constitution-
ality of comment or inference in the state courts. In Bruno v.
United States59 several of Bruno's co-defendants took the stand, but
Bruno did not testify. Counsel for Bruno requested the following
instruction:
The failure of any defendant to take the witness stand and testify
in his own behalf, does not create any presumption against him;
the jury is charged that it must not permit that fact to weigh
in the slightest degree against any such defendant, nor should
this fact enter into the discussions or deliberations of the jury in
any manner.00
Counsel urged that the instruction was compelled by the fifth
amendment. The Court ignored the fifth amendment argument and
based its decision on the federal competency statute of 1878.1 The
statute which afforded competency as a witness to the accused
simultaneously provided that his failure to take the stand "shall
not create any presumption against him.1" 2 Inherent in the Court's
opinion was the implication that the statute was not based on the
fifth amendment: in discussing the accused's immunity from com-
ment the Court termed it "a privilege which Congress has given
him." 3
58 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
59 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
60 Id. at 292.
61 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
62 20 Stat. 30 (1878), now 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
63 308 U.S. at 294. Because of the competency statute the Supreme Court has
never been forced to decide whether the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits
comment or an inference. However, a few lower federal courts have indicated that
the Constitution as well as the competency statute bars comment or inference. The
best of these cases is DeLuna v. United States, 308 F2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), in which
the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant whose trial was irretrievably
prejudiced by commentary on his refusal to testify made by a co-defendant's attorney
in closing argument. Judge Wisdom's scholarly majority opinion asserts a fifth amend-
ment violation, id. at 141, but rests as well upon a fair construction of the competency
statute, id. at 150-55. Bell, C.J., concurring, reaches the unexceptionable result by
means of the sixth amendment guarantee of fair trial. Id. at 155 (concurring opinion).
In United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan, 337 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1964), the Sixth
Circuit recently granted habeas corpus to a state prisoner by finding that an Ohio trial
in which the prosecutor had commented upon the accused's refusal to testify was by
that fact infected with unconstitutionality. The court noted that Malloy had made the
privilege applicable to the states with full federal impact, id. at 992, and asserted that
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It is significant that forty-two of the states have enacted
statutes prohibiting inference 4 or comment 5 or both.66 The federal
statute, which was enacted after passage of similar legislation in
several of the states,67 was patterned upon Massachusetts law.6
The import is that both a substantial majority of the state legis-
latures and Congress felt that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not of itself prevent comment. However, two notable
legislative enactments indicating a different opinion are the legis-
lative amendments to the Ohio69  and California70 constitutions
passed in 1912 and 1934 respectively. The amendments, which are
"the protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment includes not
only the right to refuse to answer incriminating questions, but also the right that
such refusal shall not be commented upon by counsel for the prosecution." Ibid.
64 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2016 (1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-15 (1953);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 148, § 22 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 4 (1957) ; Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233 § 20 (1959) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.175 (1955) ; N. Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 393; N. C. Gen. Stat. § 8-54 (1953) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 139.310 (1963) ;
S. D. Code § 34.3633 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2403 (1955); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 325.13 (1958).
65 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 918.09 (1944).
66 Ala. Code tit. 15, § 305 (1958) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-163 (1956) ; Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3501 (1953) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 222-15 (1955) ; Idaho Code
Ann. § 19-3003 (1948) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961) ; Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 9-1603 (1956) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-1420 (1949) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.225
(1963) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.11 (1947) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 1691 (1942) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 546.270 (1953); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-8803 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-2011 (1956) ; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:32 (1955) ; N. D. Rev. Code § 29-21-11
(1943) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 631 (1964) ; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-17-9 (1956) ;
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 710 (1941) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-5 (1953) ; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 6601 (1959) ; Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-264 (1960) ; W. Va. Code
Ann. § 5731 (1955) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-244 (1957).
67 Colorado: Act of Feb. 5, 1872, Sess. Laws (1872) at 95; Idaho: Act of Jan.
14, 1875; Rev. Laws of Idaho (1874-5) § 12, at 321; Illinois: Act of March 27, 1874,
Rev. Stat. (1874) c. 38, §426; Kansas: Act of Feb. 21, 1871; Laws of Kan. (1871)
c. 118, at 280; Maryland: Act of April 7, 1876; Laws of Md. (1876) c. 357, at 601;
Missouri: Act of April 18, 1877; Laws of Mo. (1877) at 356; Montana: Laws of
Mont. (1872) at 271-72; Nebraska: Act of March 4, 1873; Laws of Neb. (1873)
§ 473, Gen. Stats. 1873, at 827; Pennsylvania: Act of April 3, 1872; Laws of Pa.
(1872) at 34; Act of March 24, 1877; Laws of Pa. (1877) at 45; see also Act of May
,21, 1885; Laws of Pa. (1885) at 23; Rhode Island: Act of March 15, 1871; R. I.
Laws (1871) c. 907, at 134; R. I. Gen. Stat. (1872) c. 203, § 39; Utah: Act of Feb. 22,
1878; Laws of Utah (1878) at 151; see also Utah Comp. Laws (1876) at 505; Wash-
ington: Act of Nov. 29, 1871; Laws of Wash. (1871) at 105; Wyoming: Act of
Dec. 6, 1877; Laws of Wyo. (1877) at 25; and see Wyo. Comp. Laws (1876) c. 14,
§ 129.
68 7 Cong. Rec. 385 (1878).
69 Ohio Const. art. I, § 10.
70 Calif. Const. art. I, § 13.
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substantially identical and which specifically permit the drawing
of an inference and comment, were felt necessary by the respective
states if comment was not to violate the privilege against self-in-
crimination as guaranteed by each state constitution.
7
'
The Purposes of the Privilege
The evolution of the various theories about the purpose of the
privilege against self-incrimination is not within the scope of this
article. Their moment on comment is that comment is unconstitu-
tional if it is incompatible with the purposes of the privilege.
Wigmore has winnowed from the suggested purposes behind the
privilege two of genuine significance.
The significant purposes of the privilege ... are two: The first
is to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances
where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal in-
humanity being abusive tactics by a zealous questioner.... The
second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual
is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between govern-
ment and individual require that the individual not be bothered
for less than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponent
to defeat himself... 72
71 See People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530 (1869), where the court said:
If the inference in question could be legally drawn the very act of exercising
his option as to going upon the stand as a witness, which he is necessarily
compelled by the adoption of the [competency] statute to exercise one way or
the other, would be, at least to the extent of the weight given by the jury
to the inference arising from his declining to testify, a critnination of himself.
(Emphasis in original). The court held that comment was barred by Calif. Const.
art. I, § 8 (1849).
See also 2 Ohio Constitutional Convention Proceedings and Debates 1595 (1912):
A Delegate: What is the object of putting in line 25 there, "but his failure
to testify may be considered by the court and jury and the same may be made
the subject of comment by counsel?" Is there anything in the present consti-
tution that prevents that?
Mr. Fitzsimmons: Yes.
Mr. Mauck: Has not the clause, "no person shall be compelled, in any criminal
case, to be a witness against himself' been construed so as not to permit any
comment on the fact that he fails to testify?
Mr. Riley: That is where it comes in.
See also Tate v. State, 76 Ohio St. 537, 540-41, 81 N.E. 973 (1907), where the court
said of the significance of the statute granting competency to an accused:
The obvious purpose of the statute was to confer upon an accused person the
right, previously denied him, to testify in his own behalf, and to so confer it as
to preserve unimpaired his constitutional immunity from being compelled to
testify against himelf... To accomplish that it was distinctly provided 'but
his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against him'
72 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251, at 318 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For other
articles dealing with the first purpose of the privilege see American Bar Association
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The value accorded to the first purpose by the Supreme Court
is titanic-no less is demonstrated by its rejection of confessions
induced by mental compulsion.73 If the Court incorporates into the
self-incrimination area the prohibition against mental compulsion
expressed in the coerced confessions cases, comment or inference
would violate the privilege. With its analysis in Malloy that the
prohibition against the use of coerced confessions had as a basis
the privilege against self-incrimination,7 4 the Court established
grounds for adoption of coerced confession law in the self-incrimina-
tion area. The likelihood that the prohibition against mental com-
pulsion is a part of confessions law which will be found applicable
to the privilege area is substantial, for in Malloy the Court noted:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the
same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against
federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent un-
less he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
Committee on the Improvements in the Law of Evidence, in 63 A.B.A. Rep. 570, 591
(1938) ; Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 186, 188 (1956). For other articles dealing
with the second purpose of the privilege see Clapp, "Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion," 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 541, 548 (1956); Fortas, "The Fifth Amendment: Nemo
Tenetur Prodere Seipsum," 25 Cleve. B.AJ. 91, 98-99 (1954). See Griswold, The
Fifth Amendment Today 7-9 (1955). My thesis, underlying the test suggested infra
at 594, is that the fifth amendment privilege is "a limited immunity from the common
duty to testify" evoked by "historical reasons" which Wigmore adequately limns, id
§ 2250, and that it both is not and ought not be made a vast prohibition of govern-
mental power. The collateral predicate is that the individual at trial deserves no more
than a guarantee that the guilt-determining process will not be polluted by evidence
which is either irrelevant or touched with relevance, but pregnant with prejudice.
73 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The Court said, "We conclude
that petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely
aroused... "' Id. at 323. In Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), a confession
was held coerced when induced by threats that state financial aid for accused and her
infant children would be cut off and her children taken from her if she did not co-
operate; in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), a confession was held in-
admissible when secured by refusing to allow the suspect to call his wife until he
confessed. See also Herman, "The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interro-
gation," 25 Ohio St. L.J. 449 (1964).
74 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964):
Today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is
tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions since 1897, when,
in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, the Court held that 'In criminal trials,
in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a
confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by
that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."'
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will, and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such
silence.75
Notwithstanding portents that the Supreme Court may decide
otherwise, it is submitted that the evils sought to be prevented by
the prohibition against mental compulsion of an accused at the
police station are not necessarily attendant at a trial. If the accused
is not coerced to testify by comment or inference, the first purpose
of the privilege has not been violated, because he has not been sub-
jected to cross-examination. If the accused does testify because of
fear of comment or inference, abridgement of the first purpose of
the privilege is easily prevented by regulation of the prosecutor's
cross-examination.76 In other words, means of controlling the exam-
iner exist at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding which do not
exist at the police station where the interrogation is often conducted
under clandestine circumstances.
It is more difficult to find comment compatible with the second
purpose of the privilege-protection of the sovereignity of the in-
dividual against the state. The Supreme Court, speaking in general
of this ideal, has asserted that in its contest with the individual the
government should be required to shoulder the entire load.77 The
Court has effectuated this sentiment by its holdings in the areas
of search and seizure, right to counsel, and coerced confessions. 78
75 Id. at 8.
76 See Maquire, Evidence of Guilt 13 (1959) for a discussion of the contention
that the privilege is unnecessary to prevent brutality when the questioning of an
accused takes place under well supervised circumstances; see also Note, "Procedural
Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime,"
78 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 445-46 (1964) in which the author proposes an accused be
immediately brought before a magistrate after arrest, informed of his privilege against
self-incrimination, be afforded the right not to testify as at a trial; but, if he chooses
to remain silent, be subjected to comment upon such silence when he is formally tried.
77 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
78 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), held introduction of evidence of paint
and brush procured by an illegal search and seizure reversible error. The significance
of this case to the use of comment or an inference is that the Court said that the
question to be decided was not whether the erroneous admission of the evidence could
have changed the outcome of the trial but whether there was a reasonable possi-
bility that it might have. By analogy the fact that the use of an inference in Cali-
fornia, Iowa, Connecticut, and New Jersey might change the outcome of a trial
would be reversible error, assuming that an inference is found unconstitutional by the
Court. The Ohio situation as discussed in hypothetical number three clearly changes
the outcome of the trial; thus there is no question that the use of such an inference
would be reversible error if an inference is found to be unconstitutional.
Massiah v, United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), held the use in evidence of in-
criminating statements made after indictment in the absence of counsel, which state-
meats were recorded by police with the assistance of co-defendant, reversible error.
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The fallacy in applying the apotheosis of the accusatorial system
demonstrated in those areas to comment and inference at a trial
is this: at the trial stage in a criminal proceeding there are multiple
safeguards for the individual which are either non-existent or exist
only in part during a search and seizure or police interrogation."
Most importantly, having secured an indictment or prosecutor's
information the state has demonstrated that there is good reason
for it to disturb the accused. Therefore, it is submitted that the
privilege alone should not bar the state's use of evidence elicited
during the trial-the testimony of the accused or the inference of
guilt resultant from his silence.
A Test for Determining Violation of the Privilege
While the purposes of the privilege already mentioned do not
warrant prohibition of the use of comment or inference, protection
of an accused from a conviction based on factors irrelevant to the
likelihood of guilt-poor demeanor, prior convictions-necessitates
a more limited use of comment or inference than is now permitted.
It is significant that such protection is a result of the privilege when
it is unaccompanied by comment or inference. And although such
protection could more properly be afforded by revising the evi-
dentiary rules governing relevancy, it has been provided to date by
finding comment or inference violative of the privilege. Thus to
prevent undue prejudice to the accused the suggested essential is
that the privilege at the trial stage protect the innocent and guilty
from a conviction based upon factors irrelevant to the likelihood
of guilt. If the reason the accused does not wish to testify is that
he committed the crime and he takes the stand because of fear of
comment and is convicted, the essential of the privilege has not
been violated. If the accused does not wish to testify because he
fears disclosure of prior convictions8" and he takes the stand because
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), use in evidence of a confession obtained
by police interrogation prior to indictment and absent requested counsel was held re-
versible error. See generally Herman, supra note 73.
79 Meltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination," 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 691-92 (1951):
Wigmore's principal argument for the privilege at the trial stage ... slights
some important considerations, such as the necessity for a showing of probable
cause before the trial is initiated; the reluctance of prosecutors, intent on their
record of convictions, to rely on the possibility that the defendant will convict
himself.... Moreover, it plays down the protection provided for the defendant
by the court and counsel. Indeed, Wigmore seems strangely to ignore. his own
warning against confusing a public judicial inquiry. with a torture chamber.
80 See quote in Ohio Constitutional Convention, supra note 71, at 1597, of pam-
phlet by Edward S. Wilson of the Ohio Bar.
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of fear of comment, whereupon the prior convictions are shown by
the prosecution and he is convicted, the essential of the privilege
has been violated and the conviction should be reversed upon
appeal. However, if the prior convictions are not disclosed by the
prosecution, then the essential of the privilege has not been violated
and the conviction should be upheld. If the dissuasion against
testifying for the accused is fear that his demeanor on the stand
will create an unfavorable impression on the jury"' and he takes
the stand because of fear of comment and is convicted, then the
question on appeal should be whether his demeanor created an
impression on the jury which might have changed the outcome of
the trial. If the question is answered in the affirmative, then the
essential of the privilege has been violated and his conviction should
be reversed upon appeal.
In the above examples it has been assumed that the accused
takes the stand because of fear of comment. If fear of comment is
not a primary cause of his testifying, his privilege against self-in-
crimination has not been violated. On appeal the burden of showing
that the accused voluntarily waived the privilege should be on the
prosecution. This would entail showing the absence of recognized
motivation-prior convictions, poor demeanor, 2 other factors de-
monstrably irrelevant to the probability of his guilt or innocence
but likely to prejudice a jury against him-for remaining silent.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONALTY
The question of fourteenth amendment constitutionality of
comment or inference as allowed in Iowa, New Jersey, Connecticut
and Ohio arises when the accused remains silent. As discussed with
reference to the privilege, protection of the individual from the
state does not compel a prohibition against an inference of guilt
based on the accused's silence. Such an inference does not change
the burden of proof, because the state still must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore an inference is no more than
an item of evidence which the state may utilize to prove its case.
Moreover, it is suggested that the essential here is the same as the
81 See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893):
Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against [de-
fendant], will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him.
82 Some method will have to be devised for insuring that the poor demeanor of
the accused will be disclosed in the transcript. A suitable procedure might be to limit
the types of poor demeanor, for example, overt homosexuality, which will be recog-
nized as a suitable reason for the accused to wish not to take the stand, in conjunction
with providing that such poor demeanor will be noted in the transcript by the judge.
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essential in the self-incrimination area-protection of both innocent
and guilty from a conviction based upon factors irrelevant to the
likelihood of guilt.8 3 Certainly a prior record or a poor demeanor
presently provide reasons other than guilt which may account for
the muteness of an accused. And as demonstrated in hypothetical
number two, in Iowa, New Jersey and Connecticut the accused,
silent because of a prior record or poor demanor, may find his silence,
in fact his prior record or poor demeanor, used by the jury to con-
vict him. In Ohio, as illustrated in hypothetical number three, given
a situation in which the prosecution's evidence is not sufficient to
convict the accused, he will find his silence, in fact his prior record
or poor demeanor, so used.
The suggested test for determining whether comment or an
inference violates the privilege against self-incrimination removes
the possibility that an accused did not testify because of his poor
demeanor or record of prior convictions. Assume that the accused
takes the stand and either his record of prior convictions is shown
by the prosecution or his poor demeanor results in a prejudiced
jury. In such instances the test provides for a reversal. Thus an
accused should not be afraid to testify because of his prior convic-
tions or poor demeanor. Therefore when he chooses to remain
silent, an inference of guilt is warranted. While this prevents the
prosecution from proving its case by using prior convictions or
poor demeanor of the accused, it is not unreasonable, because it
provides the prosecution with something more relevant to the guilt-
determining process-the testimony of the accused.8 4 It is note-
worthy that the Uniform Rules of Evidence permit comment and
an inference if the accused does not testify, 8 but if he does testify
he may not be impeached by proof of prior convictions unless he
first puts his character in issue. 6 The suggested test grants more
83 See section entitled Comment or Inference in the States Which Permit Them
supra at 581 for a discussion of the importance of relevancy of the accused's silence
to the inference in light of Adamson and Caninetti.
84 See Storey, "Some Practical Suggestions As To The Reform Of Criminal
Procedure," 4 J. Crim. L. & C. 495, 501 (1913), "The accused of all persons in the
world knows best whether he is guilty or innocent." See also Reynolds, "Proposed
Reforms of American Criminal Law," 32 Yale L.J. 368, 371 (1923):
Once a criminal trial ceases to be a game or a contest or a legal proceeding
governed by rules of a hoary tradition and becomes a search for the truth
without fear and without favor, what evidence is likely to be so informing
as that of the party alleged by the state to have committed the act under
investigation?
85 Uniform Rule of Evidence 23 (4):
If an accused in a criminal action does not testify, counsel may comment
upon accused's failure to testify and the trier of fact may draw all reason-
able inferences therefrom.
86 Uniform Rule of Evidence 21.
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protection to the accused than the Uniform Rules because it also
removes from the prosecution the use of the demeanor of the
accused.
With the relevancy of the silence of the accused to the prob-
ability of his guilt thus insured, the constitutionality of the use of
his silence as evidence is resolved. As discussed above, apotheosis of
the accusatorial system is unwarranted when such apotheosis is not
only unnecessary for the protection of the innocent but also dele-
terious to the guilt-determining process.
THE DESIRABILITY OF COMMENT
In the past the proponents of comment have received the
support of such established groups as the American Law Institute 7
and the American Bar Association."' In 1935 a crime conference
sponsored by the Attorney General of the United States and com-
posed of representatives of the federal, state, territorial and local
governments, as well as more than seventy-five interested organiza-
tions, recommended a rule permitting comment by court and
counsel on the failure of the defendant in a criminal case to take
the stand 9 Wigmore noted the constitutional amendment in Ohio
with approval in a lecture delivered before the attorneys of Cincin-
nati. °
The objective which the proponents of comment are trying to
attain is a more effective system for the administration of criminal
justice.9 To many this connotes only the conviction of more de-
87 9 A.L.I. Proceedings 202, 218 (1931), "The judge, the prosecuting attorney
and counsel for the defense may comment upon the fact that the defendant did not
testify."
88 56 A.B.A. Rep. 137 (1931), "That by law it should be permitted to the prosecu-
tion to comment to the jury on the fact the defendant did not take the stand as a wit-
ness; and to the jury to draw the reasonable inferences."
89 See "Resolutions Adopted By The Crime Conference," 21 A.B.A.J. 9, 10 (1935).
90 See Heintz, "Criminal Justice in Ohio," 26 J. Crim. L. & C. 180 (1935).
91 The Conference on Crime explained its sponsorship of comment and other
measures:
That the Attorney General's Conference on Crime believes that the time is
ripe for securing a substantial improvement in criminal procedure, and it
therefore recommends to all legislatures which are meeting in 1935, a careful
consideration of procedural recommendations, and particularly of the Model
Code of Criminal Procedure prepared by the American Law Institute and
approved by the American Bar Association and the Association of American
Law Schools.
"Resolutions Adopted by the Crime Conference," supra note 89, at 10. That such
improvement was the objective of the Ohio legislature in passing the 1912 amendment
permitting comment is very apparent from the debates preceding the passage. Pro-
ceedings and Debates, supra note 71, at 1604:
Mr. Peck: Look at the thousands of crimes that are committed here.
The statistics are dreadful against this country on crime. Why, we have more
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fendants,92 and the effectiveness of comment is evaluated as a
means to this end.
If the defendant does not take the stand the prosecuting attorney
... can... point his finger at accused and ask "Why did you
not take the stand and tell the jury the thing it wants to know,
to wit: whether or not thus and so is a fact?" He may thus run
the whole gamut of the case and ask the jury to draw its con-
clusions as to why the defendant did not testify. It is a withering
ordeal for the defense.
On the other hand, if counsel for the defense, in order to escape
the running fire of the prosecuting attorney in the argument,
puts the accused on the witness stand, it furnishes the prosecut-
ing attorney the opportunity to tear into shreds the testimony of
the accused .... When the prosecuting attorney says "we rest,"
the attorney for the accused looks at the vacant witness chair and
finds himself like the Greek sailors with Scylla on the one hand
and Charybdis on the other.93
in proportion to our population than any country in the world I And why
have we so many lynchings? What brings greater disrepute than a lynching?
I want to tell you, if you go across the water and read the newspapers, you
vill find that there is nothing they gloat over over there as much as the details
on an American lynching. Every one of them is published in full, with all the
details, in the London papers.
Mr. Halfhill: Are you not in error in stating that there are more homicides
in this country to the population than any country on earth?
Mr. Peck: No, sir; this country very greatly exceeds any civilized country.
There might be some in Africa that would exceed it.
92 2 Ohio Constitutional Convention, supra note 71, at 1604:
Mr. Peck: I tell you, this is an important proposition. There has not been a
more important one before this body. We must do our duty, and we must not
let our professional notions keep us from passing this proposal. The trouble
with lawyers is that they have heard all these old legal maxims and legal saws
until they have come to look upon them as a sort of ten commandments. We
represent a state, the people and a law-abiding state, and we are not here to
represent lawbreakers, or to facilitate the escape of lawbreakers, or to make
specious pleas for the poor, weak, miserable criminal .... What we want is
to convict that poor, weak criminal, and not let him do it again. It is to the
interest of society that punishment should be prompt.
93 Heintz, supra note 90, at 181; see also 2 Ohio Constitutional Convention, supra
note 71, at 1595:
Mr. Bowde: We can not compel the accused to take the witness stand
but we can at least smoke him out, by a process of allowing the court and
counsel to do that which the court and counsel can not now do-by allowing
them to draw conclusions from his failure to testify and comment upon these
conclusions.
See also Dunmore, "Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify," 26 Yale L.J. 464,
465-66 (1917), in which the author reports the results of a questionnaire submitted
to all the county prosecutors in Ohio. Of the fifty-two prosecutors who answered all
favored comment; fifteen favored the defendant's being forced to take the stand,
and the defendant took the stand in 1507 out of the 1658 criminal trials in their re-
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The justification offered for the use of comment or inference
is that if the accused were innocent he would be glad to testify. 4
Buttressing this argument is an analogy to the use as an admission
of the extra-judicial silence of the accused when he is confronted
with incriminating facts. 5 The fallacy in the reasoning of those in
favor of comment as it now exists lies in the invalid assumption
that the only possible explanation for his silence is guilt. 6 As dis-
spective counties. Dunmore, while admitting that there were no available statistics on
how many defendants took the stand prior to the 1912 amendment permitting comment,
concluded that when comment was allowed the accused usually took the stand.
94 2 Ohio Constitutional Convention, supra note 71, at 1598:
Mr. Bowdle: Has it not been your uniform observation that innocent men
charged with crime uniformly do not fail to take the stand and uniformly
do not seek the protection of the bill of rights?
In State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871), the court said: "If innocent, he will re-
gard the privilege of testifying as a boon justly conceded." Those in favor of comment
not only believe that if an accused were innocent he would testify, but they also are
convinced that a jury will reach the same conclusion regardless of whether comment
is permitted or not. Thus they urge that prohibition is pointless. Storey, supra note
84, at 506: "The inference is inevitable, and in saying that it shall not be drawn, the
law is forbidding men to use their reason." Taft, "The Administration of Criminal
Law," 15 Yale L.J. 1, 9-10 (1905) :
[A] jury may be charged as explicitly as possible to disregard the fact that
the defendant does not go on the stand, but it is impossible to eradicate in
the minds of sensible men the impression that, if one who is charged with the
crime, refuses to explain by his own evidence that he was not guilty, that the
reason for his so doing is because he is afraid he cannot so explain.
See also State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 498, 146 At. 828, 830 (1929); Parker v.
State, 61 N.J.L. 308, 314, 39 Atl. 651, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; Halsey v. State, 42 Ohio
App. 291, 295, 182 N.E. 127, 128 (1932).
gr Thus in State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217 (1867), the court said:
If a person accused remains silent when he may speak, he does so from
choice, and the choice he makes upon such occasions has always been regarded
competent evidence. . . . From time immemorial the reply or the silence of
the accused person, when charged, has been regarded as legitimate evidence
on this trial for the consideration of the jury.
This opinion was reiterated in State v. Cleaves, supra note 94, at 301, where the court
said:
When the prisoner is on trial, and the evidence offered by the government
tends to establish his guilt, and he declines to contradict or explain the in-
culpatory facts which have been proved against him, is not that a fact ominous
of criminality. Is his silence of any the less probative force, when thus in
court called upon to contradict or explain, by the pressure of criminative facts,
fully proved, than his extrajudicial silence when a charge is made to him or in
his presence?
See also State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 110, 53 A.2d 53, 62 (1947) ; State v. Wolfe, 64
S.D. 178, 196, 266 N.W. 116, 125 (1936) (Bakewell, C.J., dissenting).
96 See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), ("It is not every one
who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge
against him.") ; State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659, 671, 15 SXE. 412, 416 (1892), ("Often,
indeed generally, it is best policy for him to remain silent, even if innocent. . .");
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cussed above, fear of disclosure of prior convictions or a poor de-
meanor are possible alternatives which are applicable when an
accused refuses to testify although irrelevant in the instance of
extra-judicial silence.9 7 The potential for abuse of the individual
within such an assumption is apparent throughout the debates
preceding the Ohio Constitutional amendment permitting com-
ment:
[I]t would be a good deal better that ninety-nine criminals be
convicted, and occasionally an innocent man sent up too, for it
might be a good thing for a penitentiary to have a really inno-
cent man once in a while. I want to see a system of justice that
will get the ninety-nine even though in the process it occasionally
convicts an innocent man. Why, his reward in heaven will be
immeasurably greater.98
Although comment or inference in its present form is undesir-
able, as circumscribed by the suggested test its contribution to the
guilt-determining process is significant. It provides a means for
presenting the jury with the testimony of an accused or its equiv-
alent-an inference of guilt-when there is no apparent reason
other than guilt for his silence. As Justice Bakewell said in State
v. Wolfe, "[W] e must not overlook the fact that a criminal trial is a
proceeding to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 99
Nancy E. Ralston
State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565-66 (1868), ("In the great body of cases no wise
practitioner would permit his client, whether he believed him guilty or innocent, to
testify when upon trial on a criminal charge."). See also, State v. Holister, 157 Wash.
4, 288 Pac. 249 (1930) ; State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 273 Pac. 742 (1929) ; State
v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928); Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217
N.W. 697 (1928).
97 In addition to fear of disclosure of prior convictions and a poor demeanor the
accused's desire to test the state's case has been suggested as a reason for his silence.
State v. Browning, 154 S.C. 97, 102, 151 S.E. 233, 235 (1929) :
Defendant's able counsel may have been so certain of their position as to error
in the introduction of the indictment, and, for that reason, so sure of a re-
versal of an adverse judgment against their client, that they deemed it un-
necessary and unwise to offer testimony in his behalf.
Consideratioi of this reason is not necessary in devising a test which will protect an
accused from a conviction based upon irrelevant factors.
98 2 Ohio Constitutional Convention, supra note 71, at 1699.
99 State v. Wolfe, mtpra note 95, at 196, 266 N.W. at 125.
